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Abstract
Human decision-making underlies all economic
behavior. For the past four decades, human
decision-making under uncertainty has continued
to be explained by theoretical models based on
prospect theory, a framework that was awarded
the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. However,
theoretical models of this kind have developed
slowly, and robust, high-precision predictive mod-
els of human decisions remain a challenge. While
machine learning is a natural candidate for solv-
ing these problems, it is currently unclear to what
extent it can improve predictions obtained by cur-
rent theories. We argue that this is mainly due
to data scarcity, since noisy human behavior re-
quires massive sample sizes to be accurately cap-
tured by off-the-shelf machine learning methods.
To solve this problem, what is needed are ma-
chine learning models with appropriate inductive
biases for capturing human behavior, and larger
datasets. We offer two contributions towards this
end: first, we construct “cognitive model priors”
by pretraining neural networks with synthetic data
generated by cognitive models (i.e., theoretical
models developed by cognitive psychologists).
We find that fine-tuning these networks on small
datasets of real human decisions results in un-
precedented state-of-the-art improvements on two
benchmark datasets. Second, we present the first
large-scale dataset for human decision-making,
containing over 240,000 human judgments across
over 13,000 decision problems. This dataset re-
veals the circumstances where cognitive model
priors are useful, and provides a new standard
for benchmarking prediction of human decisions
under uncertainty.
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1. Introduction
Which gamble would you rather take: a 50/50 chance of
winning/losing $100, or a 100% chance of $0? Although
both gambles have equal expected value (payoff), the major-
ity of people systematically prefer the second (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979).
Predicting the choices that people make in such situations
is of central importance in economics and relevant to un-
derstanding consumer behavior. As suggested above, a
recurring empirical finding is that people reliably deviate
from optimal decision-making under various conditions. Ex-
tensive research has sought to understand these deviations
and the conditions that elicit them (Edwards 1954; Baron
2000; Gilovich et al. 2002, to name just a few). A prime
example is prospect theory, devised by Kahneman & Tver-
sky (1979), and a key part of Kahneman’s receipt of the
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. Constructing models
of choice behavior based on prospect theory and its descen-
dants (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1992; Erev et al. 2017)
remains an active research area in behavioral economics and
cognitive psychology. Good predictive models of human
choice also arise in AI applications as they can be used to
build artificial agents that are better aligned with human
preferences (Rosenfeld & Kraus, 2018; Russell & Norvig,
2016; Chajewska et al., 2001).
Despite these efforts, we are still far from accurate and
robust models of how people make decisions. Theoretical
explanations for deviations from maximizing expected value
are often contradictory, making it difficult to come up with
a single framework that explains the plethora of empirically
observed deviations such as loss aversion, the St. Petersburg
paradox, and many others (Erev et al., 2017). This state
of affairs has motivated several recent choice prediction
competitions (Erev et al., 2010; 2017; Plonsky et al., 2019)
in an attempt to achieve better predictive models of human
decisions.
One approach towards improving prediction has been to
leverage machine learning (ML) (Rosenfeld & Kraus, 2018;
Plonsky et al., 2017; Noti et al., 2017; Plonsky et al., 2019).
However, data scarcity has remained the key limiting fac-
tor in leveraging ML to predict human decisions. Cogni-
tive models of human decision-making (e.g., prospect the-
ory) are typically developed by behavioral scientists using
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datasets consisting of hundreds or fewer data points. Such
small datasets, coupled with the complex and noisy nature
of human behavior, increase the risk of overfitting and limit
the applicability of machine learning methods (Geman et al.,
1992; Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017).
In this work we develop and evaluate a method for enabling
machine learning to achieve better predictions of human
choice behavior in settings where data are scarce. Our ap-
proach is to treat cognitive models as a source of inductive
bias to help machine learning methods “get off the ground,”
since their predictions are closer to human behavior than un-
trained machine learning models. The resulting “cognitive
model priors” offer a solution to the problem of prediction
under data scarcity by combining the rich knowledge avail-
able in cognitive models with the flexibility to easily adapt
to new data.
Contributions:
Our contributions are as follows:
• We introduce a simple and general methodology for
translating cognitive models into inductive biases for
machine learning methods. At a high level, our method
consists of generating synthetic datasets generated
from cognitive models that can be used to establish
informative priors for ML algorithms. We focus on
the case where a neural network is trained on these
synthetic datasets and then fine-tuned using a much
smaller dataset of real human data.
• We test this methodology using two new large syn-
thetic datasets (synth15 and synth18) that capture
current theoretical knowledge about human decision-
making. Transferred to ML models, the resulting cog-
nitive model priors provide a new way to predict hu-
man decisions that integrates the flexibility of ML with
existing psychological theory.
• Using this new methodology we greatly improve state-
of-the-art performance on two recent human choice
prediction competition datasets (Erev et al., 2017; Plon-
sky et al., 2019). The resulting models operate on raw
features alone (not relying on hand-designed, theory-
based features), for the first time for a competitive
machine learning model of human decisions.
• We introduce a new benchmark dataset for human
choice prediction in machine learning that is an or-
der of magnitude larger than any previous datasets,
comprising more than 240,000 human judgments over
13,000 unique decision problems. We show that even
in datasets of this magnitude, cognitive model priors
reduce prediction error and increase training efficiency.
Related Work: There has been a growing interest in apply-
ing machine learning to problems in behavioral economics
(Camerer, 2018; Peysakhovich & Naecker, 2017; Hartford
et al., 2016) and econometrics (Mullainathan & Spiess,
2017). Several recent works have leveraged ML to gain
new theoretical insights (Peysakhovich & Naecker, 2017;
Fudenberg & Liang, Accepted; Kleinberg et al., 2017), while
other work has focused solely on improving prediction. For
example, Hartford et al. (2016) introduced an inductive bias
in the form of a specialized neural network layer, allowing
for improved prediction in the face of scarce training data.
The particular bias proposed, however, was only applicable
to the domain of two-player games.
Most closely related to our work is that of Plonsky et al.
(2017), who applied an array of popular ML algorithms
to the problem of predicting human decisions for pairs of
gambles (the same gambles we will consider in this paper).
In addition to providing baseline performance results for
a number of ML algorithms on human decision data, the
authors used significantly more data than was present in pre-
vious work (e.g., Peysakhovich & Naecker, 2017). Notably,
the authors found that the predictions made using these al-
gorithms were much poorer than a baseline model based
on psychological theory when the raw gambles were used
as input. Interestingly, however, when model inputs were
supplemented by the components of the theoretical model
(expressed as features), one of the ML models—a random
forest algorithm—showed an improvement over the base-
line psychological model. The authors also found that using
theory-based predictions as additional inputs improves per-
formance even further (Plonsky et al., 2017; 2019). These
approaches differ from ours in that they require a model-to-
feature decomposition in order to leverage the theoretical
model, which may not be unique, and can require significant
effort and expert knowledge.
2. Decision-Making Under Uncertainty
Human decision-making under uncertainty has traditionally
been studied in the context of sets of gambles with uncertain
outcomes. A single gamble is a set of N possible outcomes
xi and their probabilities pi. Given a set of M gambles,
the decision-maker must choose the single most appealing
option. In the remainder of the paper, we will be concerned
with learning a model that can predict the probability that a
human decision-maker will choose each gamble. We want
to infer a probability as opposed to a binary selection in
order to capture variability both within a single person’s
choice behavior and across different people.
2.1. Cognitive Models of Decision-Making
Given a utility function u(·) that reflects the value of each
outcome to a decision-maker, the rational solution to the
choice problem is to simply choose the gamble that maxi-
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mizes expected utility (EU):
∑N
i=1 piu(xi) (Von Neumann
& Morgenstern, 1944). Interestingly, humans do not ap-
pear to adhere to this strategy, even when allowing for a
range of utility functions. In fact, cognitive models of hu-
man decision-making were originally designed in order to
capture four deviations from EU, with the most influential
model being prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
This model asserts that people assess a quantity that takes a
similar form to expected utility, V =
∑N
i=1 pi(pi)v(xi), but
where pi(·) is a weighting function that nonlinearly trans-
forms outcome probabilities and v(·) is a subjective assess-
ment that can be influenced by factors such as whether the
outcome is perceived as a gain or a loss.
Since prospect theory was first introduced, the list of dis-
covered human deviations from expected utility has grown
significantly, making it increasingly difficult to capture them
all within a single unifying model (Erev et al., 2017). One of
the most successful recent attempts to do so is the Best Esti-
mate and Sampling Tools (BEAST) model, which eschews
subjective weighing functions in favor of a complex process
of mental sampling. BEAST represents the overall value of
each prospect as the sum of the best estimate of its expected
value and that of a set of sampling tools that correspond to
four behavioral tendencies. As a result, gamble A will be
strictly preferred to gamble B if and only if:
[BEVA −BEVB] + [STA − STB] + e > 0, (1)
where BEVA −BEVB is the advantage of gamble A over
gamble B based on their expected values, STA − STB is
the advantage based on alternative sampling tools, and e is
a normal error term.
Sampling tools include both biased and unbiased sample-
based estimators designed to explain four psychological bi-
ases: (1) the tendency to assume the worst outcome of each
gamble, (2) the tendency to weight all outcomes as equally
likely, (3) sensitivity to the sign of the reward, and (4) the
tendency to select the gamble that minimizes the probability
of immediate regret.1 In the remainder of the paper, we use
BEAST as a proxy for current theoretical progress as it both
explains a large number of behavioral phenomenon and was
built explicitly to address concerns about the applicability
of theoretical models to robust prediction.
2.2. Choice Prediction Competitions
Two important resources for evaluating predictive models
of human decision-making are the 2015 and 2018 Choice
Prediction Competition datasets (CPC15 and CPC18, re-
spectively; Erev et al., 2017; Plonsky et al., 2019). These
1For further details, see Erev et al. (2017), and source code at:
cpc-18.com/baseline-models-and-source-code/
competitions offer two benefits. First, they encompass a
large space of sets of gambles. Whereas behavioral exper-
iments tend to study only one phenomenon at a time, the
CPC datasets were explicitly designed to include sets of
gambles that elicit all known deviations from EU in addition
to other gambles sampled from a much larger problem space.
Second, although we will later argue that such datasets are
still too small to fully train and evaluate predictive models,
they are currently the largest of their kind. CPC15 contains
90 choice problems (30 test problems) for five repeated tri-
als for a total of 450 datapoints (150 test datapoints), and
CPC18 (a superset of CPC15) contains 210 choice problems
(90 test problems) for five repeated trials for a total of 1,050
datapoints (450 test datapoints).
Problems in the CPC datasets required people to choose
between a pair of gambles, A and B. Each gamble consisted
of a collection of rewards and their associated outcome
probabilities. In CPC15, gamble A was constrained to only
have only two outcomes (similar to the example given in
section 2). Gamble B yielded a fixed reward with probability
1 − pL and the outcome of a lottery (i.e., the outcome of
another explicitly described gamble) otherwise. That is,
by convention in the competition problems, a lottery is
defined as the outcome of a chosen gamble (occurring with
probability pL) that can also yield one of multiple monetary
outcomes, each with some probability. Gamble B’s lottery
varied by problem and was parameterized using a range of
options, including the number of outcomes and the shape of
the payoff distribution. In CPC18, the only difference was
that some of the problems allowed gamble A to take on the
more complex lottery structure of gamble B.
For each problem, human participants made sequential bi-
nary choices between gamble A and B for five blocks of five
trials each. The first block of each problem was assigned to
a no-feedback condition, where subjects were shown only
the reward they received from the gamble they selected. In
contrast, during the remaining four blocks subjects were
shown the reward they obtained from their selection as well
as the reward they could have obtained had they selected the
alternative gamble. Finally, gambles for problems assigned
to an “ambiguous” condition had their outcome probabili-
ties hidden from participants. Further details on the design
and format of the gamble reward distributions can be found
in Erev et al. (2017) and Plonsky et al. (2019). Prediction
of the aggregated human selection frequencies (proportions
between 0 and 1) is made given a 12-dimensional vector of
the parameters of the two gambles and the block number.
As this information is all displayed to the participant in the
course of their selection, we refer to these as “raw” prob-
lem features. Prediction accuracy is measured using mean
squared error (MSE).
To summarize, both CPC15 and CPC18 contain choice prob-
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lems separated into training and test sets. The task is to build
or train a model to predict the probability (i.e., the propor-
tion of human participants) that selected gamble A for each
problem based on the training set, and evaluate on the test
set using MSE.
2.3. Data Scarcity in Behavioral Sciences
Scientific studies with human participants often yield small
datasets. One reason for this is resource limitations: com-
pensating participants is costly, and large-scale data collec-
tion can be limited by the ability to recruit participants. A
second reason is that small datasets are a byproduct of the
theory-building process: because it is rare to know all the
relevant variables ahead of time, researchers must isolate,
manipulate, and analyze manageable sets of independent
variables over many studies rather than collect a single large
dataset.
The high variability of human behavior also makes predic-
tion challenging. Indeed, many important types of human
behavior (e.g., decision making) differ significantly across
individuals and require large sample sizes to accurately as-
sess. For example, the number of problems in CPC15 and
CPC18 for which human data could be feasibly collected
was limited because obtaining stable estimates of aggregate
behavior required a large number of human participants per
choice problem.
Small datasets and high variability may help to explain why
machine learning approaches have garnered only marginal
improvements in predicting human decisions. Given these
challenges, it is worth considering possible sources of
human-relevant inductive biases that might help alleviate
the symptoms of data scarcity.
3. Cognitive Model Priors
Scientific theory-building is principally concerned with un-
derstanding and explanation, whereas machine learning is
geared more towards prediction, often employing complex
and opaque models. Given enough data, and assuming the
domain is of tractable complexity, a machine learning model
might rediscover some of the components of an established
scientific theory, along with a number of new, potentially
complicated and nuanced improvements that may be hard
to immediately explain, but are responsible for robust and
accurate forecasting.
When data is scarce, however, theoretical models (which
tend to be relatively parsimonious compared to models from
ML) offer a valuable source of bias, resulting in inferior
accuracy but potentially superior generalization (Yarkoni
& Westfall, 2017). Ideally, we would like to find a way to
leverage the hard-won generalizability of psychological the-
ories while making use of the flexibility of machine learning
methods to develop more powerful predictive models.
Towards this goal, we propose building a bridge between
the two modeling domains via the common currency of
data. Assuming a cognitive model can be expressed as some
function f(·), where inputs are experimental task descrip-
tions or stimuli and outputs are human choices, preferences,
or behaviors, we can convert the insights contained in the
scientific model into a synthetic dataset and new model as
follows:
1. Evaluate a large range of inputs, including those with-
out accompanying human targets, to generate input-
target pairs (xi, f(xi)) for training.
2. Train a machine learning model to approximate f(·)
via (xi,f(xi)) as opposed to approximating human
decision functions directly (xi and human targets hi).
3. Fine-tune the resulting model on small, real human
datasets (xi,hi) in order to learn fine-grained improve-
ments to the scientific model.
By instantiating theoretical knowledge in a synthetic dataset,
we provide a domain-general way to construct a cognitive
model prior for ML algorithms. This prior can be explicit
(conjugate priors for Bayesian models can be interpreted as
encoding the sufficient statistics of previous experience (Box
& Tiao, 2011)) or implicit (if used for pretraining neural net-
works, those networks will be regularized towards pretrained
weights rather than an arbitrary set of initial weights).
3.1. Converting Choice Prediction Models to Data
We sampled approximately 100k new problems from the
space of possible CPC15 problems and 85k problems from
the space of possible CPC18 problems using the procedures
from Plonsky et al. (2017) (Appendix D) and Plonsky et al.
(2018) (Appendix D). These datasets of sampled problems
are at least two orders of magnitude larger than those gen-
erated previously using these procedures meant for human
experiments. We found these dataset sizes to be both fea-
sible to generate and sufficient to allow off-the-shelf ML
methods to learn good approximations to cognitive models.
For each new dataset we ensured that no problem occurred
more than once or overlapped with the existing CPC15 or
CPC18 problems, and removed “degenerate” problems in
which either both gambles had the same distribution and
payoffs or at least one gamble had no variance, but the
rewards for the two gambles were correlated. We denote
these new collections of problems as the synth15 and
synth18 datasets, respectively.
To create training targets for our cognitive model prior, we
used two publicly available versions of the BEAST model
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(section 2.1. These include the original BEAST model pro-
posed before CPC15, which we denote as BEAST15, and
the subsequent “Subjective Dominance” variant introduced
before CPC18, which we denote as BEAST18. These two
models were used to predict gamble selection frequencies
for each problem in the synth15 and synth18 datasets
respectively. These predictions could then be used as train-
ing targets for our machine learning model in order to trans-
fer insights in the theoretical models into a form that can be
easily modified given new data to learn from.
3.2. Model Setup and Fine-Tuning
We opted to use neural networks to transfer knowledge from
BEAST because they can be easily fine-tuned to real human
data after initial training and provide a number of different
options for regularization. While sequential learning of
this sort risks catastrophic forgetting (French, 1999), we
found that fine-tuning with a small learning rate (1e-6) was
sufficient to make use of prior knowledge about BEAST
internalized in the network’s weights. This allows for a
straightforward integration of cognitive model priors into
the standard neural network training paradigm.
Neural Network Architecture. We grid-searched approxi-
mately 20,000 hyperparameter settings and found the best
multilayer perceptron (MLP) overall for estimating both
variants of BEAST (as well as the other datasets/tasks in
this paper) had three layers with 200, 275, and 100 units re-
spectively, SReLU activation functions, layer-wise dropout
rates of 0.15, and an RMSProp optimizer with a 0.001 learn-
ing rate. The output layer was one-dimensional with a
sigmoid activation function to match the range of the human
targets. We also obtained lower error, less overfitting, and
more stable fine-tuning using the SET algorithm (Mocanu
et al., 2018), which consists of (1) initializing the network
as an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi random sparse graph and (2) evolving
this graph at the end of each epoch via both pruning of small
weights and the addition of new random connections. While
we don’t view this architectural choice as essential for the
application of cognitive model priors, this form of model
compression may be additionally useful when data is scarce.
3.3. Results
CPC15: The results of our analysis along with the perfor-
mance of several baseline and competing models (drawing
on Plonsky et al. 2017) are given in Table 1. For example, a
wide range of common machine learning algorithms utterly
fail to obtain reasonable MSE scores given the raw gamble
parameters shown to human participants, likely due to a lack
of data. For CPC15, BEAST15 was the competition’s theo-
retical baseline model, and beats all unaided ML methods.
The competition organizers also note that no other theory-
based models from psychology or behavioral economics,
such as prospect theory models, reached the leaderboard’s
top-10.2 The CPC15 winner was a small augmentation of
BEAST15 with no machine learning component. The table
section ML + Feature Engineering shows results for the
method employed in Plonsky et al. (2017), wherein interme-
diate features derived from BEAST15 were used as input
to ML algorithms as opposed to raw features alone (i.e.,
parameters of the gambles). Notably, these models also
do worse than the self-contained BEAST15 model with the
exception of the random forest model, which lowered test
set MSE of the CPC15 winner by 0.0001. More successful
was an ensemble that included the random forest model with
the BEAST15 prediction as an additional feature, obtaining
an MSE of 0.007. In contrast to all of these baselines, our
own method of fine-tuning a neural translation of BEAST15
by way of synth15 obtains a large reduction in MSE to
0.0053 (24% decrease).
Table 1. Performance (MSE) for CPC15 and CPC18 benchmarks.
Model MSE×100
—
—
—
—
—
–
C
PC
20
15
—
—
—
—
—
– ML + Raw Data
MLP 7.39
k-Nearest Neighbors 7.15
Kernel SVM 5.52
Random Forest 6.13
Theoretical Models
BEAST15 0.99
CPC 2015 Winner 0.88
ML + Feature Engineering
MLP 1.81
k-Nearest Neighbors 1.62
Kernel SVM 1.01
Random Forest 0.87
Ensemble 0.70
MLP + Cognitive Prior (ours) 0.53
—
C
PC
20
18
— Theoretical Models
BEAST18 0.70
ML + Feature Engineering
Random Forest 0.68
CPC 2018 Winner 0.57
MLP + Cognitive Prior (ours) 0.48
CPC18: While the same set of baselines are not available
for CPC18, the most crucial comparisons are given in the
second half of Table 1. First, BEAST18, a modification of
BEAST15, obtains a fairly low MSE score of 0.007. Since
CPC15 is a subset of CPC18, this can be considered an
improvement. Second, Plonsky et al. (2018) released a ran-
dom forest baseline that makes use of theory-inspired input
features, given it was the only successful application of
2http://departments.agri.huji.ac.il/
economics/teachers/ert_eyal/compres.htm
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ML in CPC15. Like CPC15, a small decrease in MSE of
0.0002 is obtained. The winner of the CPC18 competition—
a submission by the authors of the current paper—was a
gradient-boosted decision tree regressor and obtained a no-
table decrease in MSE for the first time using ML methods.
Part of this success is likely due to the larger CPC18 train-
ing set. Finally, the further improvement we provide in this
paper is a synth18-trained MLP that was fine-tuned on
the CPC18 training set that produced an MSE of 0.0048, a
decrease in error of 0.0022 (16%) over the competition’s
theoretical baseline. The resulting model (as well as our
MLP for CPC15) take only raw gamble parameters as input
when fully trained.
4. A New Human Decision Dataset
In many ML competitions, the published test sets often
begin to function as unofficial validation sets, eventually
leading to validation overfitting (Recht et al., 2018). Fur-
ther, CPC test sets are much smaller than most benchmark
datasets in machine learning, making for a poor overall
test of generalization. Thus, even though cognitive model
priors may make it possible to train on small datasets,
a larger dataset is still necessary to establish their value
with confidence. In the following section we introduce
choices13k, a new large-scale dataset of human risky-
choice behavior, and use it to evaluate our cognitive model
priors. Before doing so, however, we preview a crucial
initial result on this dataset to underscore the risk of using
small test sets. In Figure 1 we drew one-hundred bootstrap
samples from our larger dataset to simulate variability in
small samples of validation problems. When drawing sam-
ples the size of CPC18, the variability in fit by BEAST18
is large, and stabilizes considerably when taking samples
of up to approximately 6,500 problems. This motivates the
need to obtain a larger validation set for assessing the utility
of cognitive model priors, and also provides an opportunity
to assess whether such priors have a benefit even when data
is in abundance.
4.1. Data Collection for choices13k
We collected a dataset more than ten times the size of CPC18
using Amazon Mechanical Turk. In total, the new dataset
contained 242,879 human judgments on 13,006 gamble se-
lection problems, making it the largest public dataset of
human risky choice behavior to date. The gamble selec-
tion problems were sampled uniformly at random from the
synth15 dataset. The presentation format for the gam-
bling problems was inspired by the framework used in the
2015 and 2018 Choice Prediction Competitions (Erev et al.,
2017; Plonsky et al., 2019). The only exceptions in our
datasets is that the block parameter in CPC15 and CPC18
was reduced from five (ie., subjects completed five blocks
Figure 1. Left: The distribution of BEAST MSEs over 100 boot-
strapped samples of size equal to the CPC 2018 training dataset
(210 problems). Right: The distribution of BEAST MSEs on 50%
of the entire choices13k dataset (approx. 6,500 problems).
of five trials for each problem) to two, and that feedback
and no-feedback blocks were not required to be presented
sequentially. We found that this alteration did not signifi-
cantly affect overall predictive accuracy in our models, and
allowed us to more than halve the number of trials necessary
for each problem.
As in the CPC datasets, each problem required participants
to choose between two gambles, after which a reward was
sampled from the selected gamble’s payoff distribution and
added to the participant’s cumulative reward (Figure 2). Par-
ticipants that selected gambles on the same side of the screen
over more than 80% of the trials were excluded. In all, the
final dataset consisted of gamble selection frequencies for
an average of 16 participants per problem. Each participant
completed 16 problems in the feedback condition and four
problems in the no feedback condition and was paid $0.75
plus a bonus of 10% of their winnings from a randomly
selected problem.
4.2. Assessing the Value of Cognitive Model Priors
The expanded choices13k dataset allows us to quantify
the predictive power of psychological theory, and to assess
the relationship between data scarcity and the influence of
our cognitive model prior. To this end, we varied the amount
of training data available to neural networks that were ei-
ther randomly initialized or pretrained on the synth15
cognitive model prior. The training sets we varied were
a proportion (from 0.01 to 1.0) of our full choices13k
training set (80% of the overall dataset). The remaining 20%
of choices13k was used as a constant validation set and
the size did not vary. We repeated this process ten times.
Figure 3A plots validation MSE for a sparse MLP trained
from a random initialization (blue) and one pretrained on
synth15 (i.e., using a cognitive model prior). Standard
error contours of the average MSE scores, computed over
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Figure 2. Experiment interface for collecting human gamble selec-
tions, modeled after the interface in Erev et al. (2017).
ten train/validation splits, are shown in lighter colors. Note
that models were re-initialized for each split and so vari-
ation due to initialization is a subset of the reported error
contour regions. The MLP with a cognitive model prior
begins with a significantly lower MSE in comparison to
the randomly initialized model (0.016 versus 0.039), and
continues to exhibit better error scores all the way up to
100% of the choices13k training set (0.00945 versus
0.00947). The advantage at 25% of the training data is a
decrease by 0.0009, the advantage at 50% is a decrease by
0.0003, and the advantage at 75% is a decrease by 0.0002. It
takes just 4% of our real human data (an amount still larger
than CPC18) to cross over from an MSE above the best
obtained by all other types of machine learning algorithms
we tried (see section 4.3), to one below it, a reduction from
0.020 to 0.0138. These results suggests that cognitive model
priors may be useful in any setting where collecting human
decisions is costly, and further supports the pattern of results
in section 3.3.
Beyond overall error, Figure 3B shows validation MSE per
epoch given the full choices13k training dataset. Even
though MSE for the two types of models largely converges
(with a lingering numerical advantage in final MSE when us-
ing the prior), the MSE for the MLP with a cognitive model
prior starts lower, decreases much faster, and requires fewer
overall epochs to converge. This suggests one advantage
of cognitive model priors that we did not anticipate: faster
training. While datasets of this size do not require models
that take as long to train as, e.g., large deep neural networks,
we found this property extremely useful in allowing for
larger hyperparameter grid searches.
4.3. A Benchmark for Predicting Human Decisions
Given the size of our dataset relative to previous ones, we
propose it as the new benchmark for validating the preci-
sion and generalization of both theoretical and machine
learning models. To this end, we provide a set of starting
baseline scores as a challenge to ML practitioners (see Ta-
ble 2). Notably, while the authors of Plonsky et al. (2017)
achieved the best results on their dataset using random forest
models, we found neural networks were much more effec-
tive for our larger dataset. Our most successful model, the
result of a grid-search over 20,000 hyperparameter combi-
nations, was a sparse MLP as described above, containing
less than 10,000 parameters (down from around 100,000 for
the best full dense MLP). By the end of training (using all
choices13k data), the synth15 cognitive model prior
only added a slight numerical advantage in MSE. The advan-
tage gained by enforcing sparsity likely indicates that our
dataset, while much larger than any other of its kind, may
still benefit from additional methods for accommodating
data scarcity. Given the relatively generic (i.e., off-the-
shelf) models used here, we expect there is much room for
improvement in MSE on our dataset, particularly with spe-
cialized neural architectures combined with new ways of
exploiting our cognitive model priors.
Table 2. Baseline validation MSE scores on the choices13k
benchmark, averaged over ten 80/20 splits.
Model MSE×100
Linear Regression 4.02
k-Nearest Neighbors 2.27
Kernel SVM 2.16
Random Forest 1.41
MLP 1.03
Sparse MLP (Mocanu et al., 2018) 0.91
5. Discussion
In this paper we have provided a method for addressing the
data scarcity problem that limits the application of machine
learning methods to small behavioral datasets by using cog-
nitive models as a source of informative priors. We have
outlined a novel approach for doing just that: train a neu-
ral network on a large synthetic dataset generated from a
cognitive model and use the resulting weights of the model
as a cognitive model prior that is then fine-tuned on addi-
tional human data. Following this approach we were able
to efficiently outperform previously proposed cognitive and
machine learning methods in predicting human decisions.
We believe that the ideas suggested here may prove use-
ful to other behavioral domains such as social cognition,
marketing, and cognitive neuroscience.
The weights of the pretrained networks that encode the
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Figure 3. A. Validation MSE (20% of full choices13k human dataset) as a function of training on proportions of the training set (80%
of full choices13k human dataset), for sparse MLPs trained from a random initialization (blue), and with a cognitive model prior (red).
The prior allows for comparable MSE with significantly less data. B. Validation MSE (20% of full choices13k human dataset) as a
function of training epoch. Using a prior allows for faster training. Both x-axes are shown in log-scale.
cognitive model priors could potentially be useful even in
broader contexts if they encode a general value function for
gambles. For example, one could imagine adding a new in-
put layer with M > 2 gambles to choose from, which could
be trained in isolation before fine-tuning the full network.
The utility of cognitive model priors for human choice pre-
diction raises a number of questions. For example, how
“complex” must the cognitive model prior be in order to
produce a marked improvement in prediction error? Does
taking EU or prospect theory as the source of a prior suf-
fice to improve upon state-of-the-art prediction? Beyond
theoretical interest, this question might have practical ap-
plications as it may indicate how much effort to invest in
theory-driven models before they could be used as a source
of priors. Further, our application of the prior was in the
form of weight initialization (after pretraining), but there
are many other possibilities, such as an auxiliary loss term
for BEAST targets during fine-tuning, or an L2 weight prior
centered on the initial weights. Both of these modifications
may improve generalization.
Finally, although our focus here has been on prediction,
there are many other important ways in which models of
human decision-making are used (e.g., providing explana-
tions, interpreting behavior, inferring causality, etc). We do
not claim that models of human behavior should be evalu-
ated based solely on their predictive accuracy. Indeed, the
current approach trades some of the interpretability of the
theoretical models in Plonsky et al. (2019) for the ease of
integrating that theoretical knowledge into a more powerful
predictive modeling framework. However, we do believe
that better predictive models, even those driven by data
rather than theory, can improve our understanding of human
behavior: if machine learning methods can reach or exceed
the predictive power of psychological theories, they may be
able to point theoreticians toward regularities in behavior
that have not yet been detected by human scientists.
6. Conclusion
In the current paper we introduced an approach to incorpo-
rating theory-based inductive biases from a cognitive model
into machine learning algorithms. We demonstrated this
approach with two new synthetic datasets: synth15 and
synth18, and showed that that when data is in short supply,
the resulting cognitive model priors allowed our network to
achieve significantly better generalization performance with
fewer training iterations than equivalent models with no
such priors. We also found that integrating these cognitive
model priors into a generic neural network model improved
state-of-the-art predictive performance on two public bench-
marks, CPC15 and CPC18, without relying on hand-tuned
features. Finally, we introduced choices13k, the largest
public dataset of human risky choice behavior to date. It is
our hope that these three new datasets will support further
interaction between the machine learning community and
the behavioral sciences, leading to better predictive models
of human decision-making.
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